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Abstract
The evolution of multicellular organisms from unicellular counterparts involved a transition in
Darwinian individuality from single cells to groups. A particular challenge is to understand the
nature of the earliest groups, the causes of their evolution, and the opportunities for emergence
of Darwinian properties. Here we outline a conceptual framework based on a logical set of
possible pathways for evolution of the simplest self-replicating groups. Central to these
pathways is the recognition of a finite number of routes by which genetic information can be
transmitted between individual cells and groups. We describe the form and organization of
each primordial group state and consider factors affecting persistence and evolution of the
nascent multicellular forms. Implications arising from our conceptual framework become
apparent when attempting to partition fitness effects at individual and group levels. These are
discussed with reference to the evolutionary emergence of individuality and its manifestation
in extant multicellular life—including those of marginal Darwinian status.
S Online supplementary data available from stacks.iop.org/PhysBio/10/035001/mmedia
1. Introduction
The evolution of multicellular organisms occurred on multiple
occasions, millions of years ago, and in a past that
afforded essentially unknowable ecological conditions [1–3].
A standard and general account takes the following form:
collections of single cells, by virtue of heritable differences
in reproductive output, exist as members of Darwinian
populations [4–6]. As members of such populations, cells
participate in the process of evolution by natural selection,
that is, they are units of selection [4]. During the transition
to multicellularity, individual cells became components of
groups that eventually evolved the capacity for autonomous
reproduction [6]. The point at which this occurred—even to the
most marginal extent—marked the moment at which selection
was afforded opportunity to operate at the higher (group) level.
In some instances this led to the emergence of groups as
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Darwinian individuals—as units of selection—in their own
right.
Thinking about multicellular organisms in terms of units
and levels of selection has become increasingly important.
In the 1980s ‘multilevel section’ (MLS) theory formalized a
way to partition fitness effects among individuals and groups
[6–10]. The idea is akin to a set of matryoshka dolls with
lower levels nested within higher levels, each level replete
with Darwinian properties. Recognition of this organizational
structure has implications for understanding its consequences,
in particular, consequences that arise from the contrasting
effects of selection operating simultaneously at higher and
lower levels [11].
While primarily a theory of organizational hierarchies,
the MLS framework is often extended to questions pertaining
to origins [6, 12–14]. In terms of the origins of multicellular
organisms, it is usual to make a distinction between MLS1
and MLS2 theory [6, 8, 9]. The former encompasses early
stages in the formation of groups, where groups are formed
from single cells, by, for example, production of adhesive
glues. Kin selection theory and trait group models fall within
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this MLS1 context and describe conditions for the origin and
maintenance of cooperation [6]. In each case the focus of
selection is on individual entities that happen to evolve within
a group context. The fitness of these groups is the average (or
sum) fitness of the component cells.
MLS2 theory applies to groups that have made
the transition to multicellularity and exist as Darwinian
individuals. From an MLS2 perspective, group fitness is
defined as the number of collective offspring each group
produces. For the most part this is likely to be independent
of (decoupled from) the fitness of the individual cells that
comprise the group [6, 14].
With a focus on the evolutionary origins of multicellular
life—and drawing upon the MLS framework—it makes sense
to consider the transition from cells to collectives as the
transition from MLS1 to MLS2; that Darwinian individuality
transitions from cells to groups along with a concomitant shift
in the level at which selection acts [2, 3, 5, 6]. Theoretically this
makes sense. The difficulty is that MLS theory fails to explain
how the transition from MLS1 to MLS2 comes about. It is not
sufficient to assume that Darwinian properties inherent in the
lower level units are simply ‘moved up’ to the higher level.
Variation, heritability and reproduction are derived properties
and their emergence at the group level requires an evolutionary
explanation [5, 15, 16]. Somehow, during the transition to
multicellularity, groups evolved Darwinian characteristics.
Just how these emerged is a problem of seminal significance.
Here we consider the earliest stages in the evolutionary
emergence of multicellularity, that is, those stages during
which unicellular forms gave rise to the simplest groups.
In so doing we sidestep the MLS framework and strict
notions of Darwinian individuality in order to operate free
of assumptions that might limit concepts surrounding the form
and evolutionary properties of the earliest groups. There is no
doubt that transitions in Darwinian individuality are central
to the emergence of multicellular life; however, explaining
the emergence of Darwinian properties—particularly the
evolution of group level reproduction—requires consideration
of a set of starting states that may have been devoid of
such properties, but nonetheless, from which Darwinian
characteristics might plausibly have emerged.
From this position we outline a logical framework that
identifies a set of routes by which groups and individual
cells might interact to bring forth group level reproduction.
Central to this framework is recognition of a limited set of
pathways by which genetic information can be transmitted
between individual and group states. Each pathway defines the
form and organization of a primitive multicellular organism.
This in turn defines its evolutionary properties and, ultimately,
opportunities for selection to transition individuality. Finally,
we consider each pathway from the MLS perspective and
draw attention to issues in the partitioning of fitness effects at
individual and group levels: issues that have consequences for
the emergence of individuality, and for explaining the diverse
array of extant multicellular life—including those of marginal
Darwinian status.
2. Sufficient conditions for the evolutionary
emergence of multicellularity
Before considering the evolution of multicellularity we
establish a set of criteria that define the earliest templates.
Extant multicellular organisms are more than a diffuse
collection of cells. Indeed, even the simplest exhibit division
of labor, developmental programs, morphogenic life cycles,
and spatial patterning. While such complexity is characteristic
of current multicellular life, it need be neither defining nor
essential for all—including the earliest templates. In order to
encompass the broadest swathe of plausible founding states
(and extant types) we adopt a permissive definition that
requires the earliest cellular collectives (groups) to be units
of evolution in only a loose sense.
Defining collectives of cells that possess the minimal set of
criteria to function as units of evolution implies two sufficient
conditions.
(1) Existence. There must be a stage during the life cycle of
the organism where a group state is clearly recognizable.
(2) Evolution. Groups must be able to multiply and share
heritable information with newly created groups.
The first condition establishes the need for an identifiable
group state. This could be a collection of cells that exists
in close proximity as a consequence of a defined boundary
(which may be exogenously or endogenously defined), or due
to, for example, adhesive polymers, incomplete cell division,
flocculation, or taxis. It is not necessary that the collective
exist solely in a group state. Organisms such as the slime mold
Dictyostelium discoideum that express a life cycle alternating
between unicellular and multicellular states readily satisfy the
first condition [17].
While the first sufficient condition establishes the
existence of a collective phase, the second condition
establishes minimal requirements for the evolution of groups.
According to this condition a group of cells existing within a
population of groups can be considered a higher level unit
of evolution if groups have some capacity to multiply, if
offspring groups resemble their parents, and if there is variation
among groups. This condition is intentionally permissive and
includes the possibility for non-Darwinian groups. By not
making explicit a requirement for collective-level reproduction
(where groups directly beget groups) and avoiding the need
for variation to be linked to reproductive output, we permit the
possibility that even improbable, non-Darwinian groups might
constitute—if only temporarily—primordial units of evolution
(proto multicellular organisms). This does not preclude the
possibility that variation among groups might be directly
linked to reproductive output.
3. A framework for the evolution of multicellularity
The two sufficient conditions for evolutionary emergence of
multicellularity identify a primordial multicellular organism
when it arises in a population, but these conditions say
nothing about its organization or evolutionary fate. To this
end, we model the first appearance of cells that form groups
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Figure 1. Schematic for the origin of group G from unicellular
organism I. In an unstructured environment, independent unicellular
organisms (I) divide and occasionally produce a mutant g cell. The g
cells form a group G such that when a g cell divides the offspring
remain a part of the same group G. This conceptual model provides
a template for the evolution of multicellular organisms.
Figure 2. Three types of primordial groups. This framework
categorizes the earliest self-replicating groups into three types that
satisfy the two sufficient conditions. The first type (type 1) is the
origination of a group G (comprised of g cells) capable of
multiplication without need of the unicellular I state. The organism
in this case is simply the G state though there is the possibility of
cycling between individual I and group G states. In type 2 the group
is perpetually produced by the I state. While the groups can increase
in size through the growth of g cells, G groups cannot reproduce.
The only way for a new G group to arise is via the I state. Finally, in
type 3, groups multiply via an I state, but unlike type 2 the groups
can produce I cells themselves. Here, the g cells in a group
occasionally produce an I. Because the genetic distance is small, the
I cells produced by g still have the genetic material capable of
forming groups G. In types 2 and 3 the multicellular organism is a
combination of I and g cells.
and consider the conditions that permit groups to persist
and evolve. We assume a spatially unstructured world of
unicellular organisms (I for individuals) free to move about
and capable of reproduction. With each division there is a
probability that a mutation will produce a new type of cell
(g). The g cells form a cohesive group G and thereby satisfy
the first sufficient condition (figure 1). This group state may
be due to any number of different mutations such as those
that lead to production of glue on a cell surface or cause
failure of cells to separate post division. As individual g cells
reproduce, the offspring initially remain part of the same
group so that groups grow in size. Within this framework
there are three possible routes for groups to multiply
and satisfy the second sufficient condition (figure 2, also
supplementary material for an explanatory model (available
from stacks.iop.org/PB/10/035001/mmedia)). The difference
between these routes depends on whether groups have an
innate capacity to produce new groups (type 1), or rely solely
on unicellular states to reproduce (type 2), or rely on both
group and individual states for reproduction (type 3). As a
consequence of these differences, each route presents unique
opportunities and challenges to the success of the nascent
multicellular organism.
3.1. Type 1
The first route to multicellularity (type 1) stems from groups
G that emerge with a capacity to multiply that is independent
of the unicellular ancestral state. This category encompasses
groups that multiply as a result of fragmentation as wrought by
some external environmental factor, as well as groups that have
an intrinsic capacity for division. While an intrinsic capacity
for multiplication (concomitant with group formation) might
seem improbable, such possibilities can be envisaged. Indeed,
we can conceive the emergence of groups G that at the moment
of origin have the capacity to cycle between collective and
dispersing states.
Consider the possibility a g cell, arising by mutation from
I, expresses a gene that encodes an adhesive polymer and
thereby forms a group. Furthermore, by chance, the gene is
under the control of an environmental factor that accumulates
as the number of g cells grows. Once a threshold level of factor
is exceeded, the gene expressing the polymer is repressed
which leads to dispersal of the g cells.
A further example of de novo multiplication, although
seemingly less probable, was recently observed in experiments
with yeast populations subject to selection for sedimentation
[18]. Here, the most successful types formed snowflake-
like groups that reproduce via a form of fission. Initially
groups reproduce via fragmentation and later as a result of
increased rates of localized cell death. As cells die within
the group, connections between cells are severed, giving rise
to new snowflake groups. Given that cell death is a natural
feature of yeast it seems that expression of this trait in newly
formed groups coincidentally (and fortuitously) allowed group
reproduction.
Irrespective of the mechanism by which G groups
multiply, such groups will be maintained within a population
provided the expected number of offspring per organism over
its life time (WG) is at least one (WG  1).
While it is straightforward to think of the success of
the type 1 organism in terms of expected offspring per
life time, there is an implicit notion that the group has a
finite ‘life time’ ending with death of the collective. This
has significant implications for the evolutionary success of
nascent multicellular organisms. Manifestation of death at the
group level sets the time frame within which the group must
reproduce. Consider the snowflake phenotype in which death
of individual cells facilitates group division and cell division
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increases group size. The only way such a G organism can die
is if all individual cells die before any one cell divides. This
significantly increases the life span of the group and makes
it more likely to satisfy the condition WG  1. If instead the
organism died upon death of just a small subset of cells (as
is the norm for many extant multicellular organisms), then
it would be prohibitively less likely to survive. Thus, as a
new type I organism emerges, so too do the conditions that
determine its death.
For completeness it is necessary to consider the possibility
that a complex life cycle could emerge under type 1 in which
group and individual states cycle with each state capable of
reproduction. Any time a group G arises from an individual
I cell, it faces the same pressures to survive as though there
were no route back to I. Since G states can divide on their own,
there exists the evolutionary opportunity to forego production
of the I state and end the cycling between types.
3.2. Type 2
In the second (type 2) route to multicellularity groups cannot
reproduce independently of I cells. The only way that groups
propagate is for I cells to continually generate g cells and
thereby G groups. This dependence means that unlike type 1
organisms, the organism in type 2 is a combination of G and
I states. Without the I state the G state cannot multiply and
without the G state the I state is not multicellular.
Considering the breadth of possible configurations within
this category there exist two extremes, both of which constitute
multicellular organisms, but only one of which offers the
possibility for Darwinian evolution of groups. Both extremes
involve a lineage of I cells that produce g cells analogous to
a perpetual ‘germ line’. For one extreme, in which Darwinian
evolution of groups is not possible, the I cells give rise
stochastically to g cells that detach and drift away, conferring
no adaptive benefit to the I cells. These g cells form G groups
with finite life spans but exert no influence on the fitness of
the unicellular state, I. Any evolution at the group level would
be solely a byproduct of selection on I cells combined with
differences in survival rates of groups. Nonetheless, an outside
observer would notice the presence of groups and even witness
changes in the frequency of groups. Of course it is not beyond
possibility that future evolution of the g cells might result in
groups with some capacity for autonomous multiplication thus
transitioning to a type 1 state.
At the opposite extreme, and readily envisioned, is
the normal state for metazoan reproduction, in which the
dependence between I and G states represents the basic
germ/soma distinction [19]. Soma is an evolutionary dead
end since it cannot reproduce itself directly and must rely
on the germ line. In return, soma offers some benefit, such as
increased likelihood of survival, to the germ line [13, 14].
The difference between these two extremes—both of
which share the reliance on the germ line for the production of
groups—highlights an important feature, namely, the degree
of feedback between the cell I and group G states. The moment
there is some dependence of I states on G states, the G state is
likely to acquire the capacity for differential reproduction thus
becoming a unit of selection.
Even though the production of soma G from germ I is
usually fixed in the genome via developmental programs, at
its origination, the initial production of g cells from I cells
is likely to have been caused by a random mutation. Before
this mutation, I cells give rise solely to other I cells, but
afterwards, the mutation might create a line of I cells that
has some tendency (stochastic or deterministic) to produce
g cells. Furthermore, I cells that produce groups (call them
IG) are likely to compete with other I cells not producing
groups (II). As only a small genetic distance separates IG
from II , there exists the possibility for IG to revert to II ,
leading to disappearance of the G state and by extension the
proto multicellular organism. The success of such an organism
therefore depends on conditions that favor IG over II .
In the extreme case where there is no feedback between
groups G and the IG cells that give rise to them, it is unlikely that
conditions will favor IG over II . When an IG cell divides it either
produces a g cell and thereby a group G, or another IG cell. The
consequence of this decision depends on the fitnesses of the
two cell types (IG and g). If g cells have a selective advantage
compared to I cells then they will drive the I cells extinct. This
will leave a population of g cells that form one G organism
with no way for the group G to reproduce. Since the groups
cannot multiply, this organism does not constitute a unit of
evolution because it violates the second sufficient condition.
If, on the other hand, g cells are less fit than IG (and II) cells,
then II cells will be favored over IG because they avoid the cost
of producing maladapted g types. Ultimately there will be no
emergence of G and no multicellular organism.
For IG cells to have a selective advantage over II , the
production of groups G must be beneficial. Groups might,
for example, offer protection against predation, or allow
occupancy of a new niche, or increase the fecundity of I
cells by some means. If the advantage of the group is not
preferentially conferred on the IG types, but rather to I cells
in general, then the advantage would be a public good and
therefore subject to exploitation. Under such conditions, II
cells are likely to outcompete IG cells because they do not
suffer the costs associated with producing groups. Thus, to
stabilize the production of groups, the benefit groups afford
must preferentially accrue to IG types.
Multicellular organisms with germ/soma distinctions
often have a soma that encompasses the germ line thereby
ensuring that those IG that give rise to a group G benefit directly
from its production. As long as the expected offspring per IG
is not less than II , WIG  WII , then the production of G is
expected to be maintained.
3.3. Type 3
Lastly, we consider the type 3 route to multicellularity, which
combines elements of the other two types. Like type 2, G
groups reproduce via I cells. Unlike type 2, g cells within the
group G can produce I cells. By enabling g cells to produce I
cells, groups are no longer evolutionary dead ends but rather
can divide independently of their I progenitors, similar to type
1. Here, the multicellular organism is a combination of g and
I cells in which genetic information is transmitted between
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both types. This is different from type 2 in which only I cells
pass the genetic information for creating groups. Thus, for a
group G to survive it must reliably produce I cells that in turn
reliably produce g cells. A biological example of an organism
that alternates between individual and group states is the ciliate
Sorogena stoianovitchae whose I cells can divide on their own
but go through a group phase (aggregation and fruiting body)
to colonize new environments [20].
It has been suggested that the mutual dependence between
individual I and group G states may be important for the
evolution of cooperating groups in the face of destructive
cheating types [21]. The I cells can be viewed as cheats,
because they do not act as members of group G. Although
cooperation is usually undone by cheats, the cheating types
(I) carry the genetic information necessary to generate groups.
From the perspective of the g cells, the I cells are its nemesis,
and yet from the perspective of the G groups, I cells are its
savior [15].
On first emergence, switching between states is likely
to rely on mutation, which means that g cells and the
I cells they produce (and vice versa) will have subtly
different genetic constitutions. Heritability is thus marginal,
but nonetheless, the rate of switching is likely to be heritable.
Significantly though, switching via mutation may be sufficient
to provide the opportunity for a subsequent mutation to bring
the capacity to transition between states under epigenetic
and ultimately developmental control [22], thus solving the
problem of heritability. Such an outcome has been observed
in experimental bacterial populations that have experienced
continual selection for the ability to transition between two
states [23].
Although heritability constitutes a difficulty for the
nascent type 3 organism, the fact that G groups can arise
from single I cells means a clear divide—in the form of a
bottleneck—between states. Such a bottleneck ensures that
each new G group is founded by a single g cell which reduces
within-group variation and thus minimizes conflicts within
nascent groups.
The success of a type 3 organism depends on the
selection for both g and I cells. This distinguishes it from
the other two forms of multicellularity that require the
selection of only one type of cell: g in type 1 and IG
in type 2. To maintain type 3 multicellularity, selection
must maintain two phenotypes. The problem is analogous
to the maintenance of bet hedging, stochastic switching, and
bacterial persistence [24–27]. In all of these circumstances,
organisms generate multiple responses/phenotypes in the face
of unpredictable environmental fluctuations. In the case of
type 3 multicellularity, if newly emergent organisms inhabit
a single environment in which g and I cells compete, then
either g or I will win, but not both. If, on the other hand,
selective conditions fluctuate between favoring groups G and
individuals I, then organisms that tune the rates at which they
transition between types in order to maximize geometric mean
fitness will dominate. The optimal rates of transition between
types depends on the characteristics of the environments and
their frequency of fluctuations [24–27].
If we consider the example of S stoianovitchae, then
those organisms that fail to generate the fruiting body
(group) will be compromised in their capacity to disperse
to new environments. The first environment (EI) constitutes
a phase during which unicellular organisms compete for
limited resources. Once resources are depleted, there is
selective pressure to form a fruiting body and with this, the
opportunity to disperse to new environments. Since groups
are favored (because of the benefits associated with dispersal),
the environment shifts from EI to EG. Those cells that do not
form a group have limited opportunity to access new resources
and likely face extinction. Under this scenario the probability
of producing a group must be greater than 0 in order for an
organism to compete in combinations of EI and EG. These
conditions select for stable production of both I and G and
thus ensure maintenance of a type 3 organism.
3.4. The MLS1-to-MLS2 divide and fitness decoupling
The framework outlined above defines three distinct pathways
by which multicellularity might evolve from unicellular
precursors and does so without explicit reference to levels
of selection or the focus of selection. As we have argued,
this enables consideration of plausible primordial groups that
may have marked the earliest stages in the evolution of
groups and from which groups with Darwinian properties may
subsequently evolve. With such groups in mind it is interesting
to consider their place within the MLS framework, where the
transition to multicellularity is represented as the shift from
MLS1 to MLS2 [6]. Central to this shift is the notion of fitness
decoupling, that is, a recognition that as the higher (group)
level entity emerges as a unit of selection, fitness at the higher
level becomes decoupled from the fitness of the cellular entities
that comprise the ‘lower level’ [13, 14].
The question of fitness decoupling in type 1 organisms
depends on g cells since they determine both individual and
group fitnesses. In the example of the snowflake phenotype
of yeast, faster growing g cells produce faster dividing G
groups (assuming a fixed probability of cell death). Such a
correlation between growth of individual cells and rate of
group multiplication implies an MLS1 framework because
group fitness is determined by cell fitness. Consider, however,
the possibility that the rate of cell death increases. This
would lead to fitness decoupling because group fitness would
oppose cell fitness. Thus multicellularity evolving by the
type 1 pathway might fall within either MLS1 or MLS2
frameworks.
Interestingly, the appropriate MLS framework can be
relative (figure 3). Consider a snowflake phenotype composed
of g cells defined by only two parameters: a growth rate and
a death rate. Imagine that over time growth rate increases,
followed by an increase in death rate. Ultimately this results in
a genotype that can generate more g cells and more G groups
in a fixed amount of time as compared to the original ancestor.
An outside observer witnessing the beginning time points
(T0–T2 in figure 3) might claim that the MLS1 framework
applies, because the growth rate is higher for individual g
cells (cell fitness is higher). Another observer who witnessed
only the ending time points (T2–T4 in figure 3), in which
death rate increased, would argue that the MLS2 framework
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Figure 3. Fitness decoupling in types 1 multicellularity. An example
type 1 multicellular organism (a simplified model inspired by the
yeast snowflake phenotype, details in supplementary material
(available from stacks.iop.org/PB/10/035001/mmedia)) produces
new groups when g cells die. The bottom partition of the graph
shows the change of growth and death rates of g cells over time. The
top partition shows the corresponding abundance for g cells (black)
and G groups (gray). Comparing T2 to T0, the number of g cells and
groups has increased and selection thus seems to focus on the
individual level (MLS1). However, when comparing T3 to T2 it is
apparent that fitness decoupling has occurred (MLS2). Following
the trajectory from T0 to T4, one would conclude that an MLS1 to
MLS2 transition has occurred. If, instead the sections T1– T2 and
T2– T3 were reversed, one would conclude that an MLS2 to MLS1
transition occurred. Thus, the exact trajectory needs to be known in
order to determine the type of MLS multicellularity even though the
starting and ending points (T0 and T4) are identical.
applies, because increased death rate sacrifices individual cell
fitness for group fitness. A third outside observer witnessing
the entire course of evolution (T0–T4 in figure 5) would see
firstly an increase in growth rate, followed by an increase in
death rate. Such an observer would argue evolution involved
a shift from MLS1 to MLS2. If, however, evolution resulted
in firstly an increase in death rate, followed subsequently by
an increase in growth rate, then an observer would conclude
evolution involved a shift from MLS2 to MLS1. Thus, although
the beginning and ending states of the system are identical,
transitions would have occurred in opposing directions.
The classifications therefore depend on previous known
historical states in order to determine the directionality of the
evolutionary transition, and consequently the appropriate MLS
framework.
The application of MLS1 and MLS2 frameworks to type
2 multicellularity depends on how the lower (individual) level
is defined. While type 2 multicellularity embodies both g and
IG cells, success of the nascent organism hinges on the success
of IG cells. In its simplest form, the fitter the IG cells, the
greater the number of both groups and individuals (both IG
and g cells) produced (figure 4). Not only does this result in
an alignment of group and individual fitnesses, but the group
is only created so long as it enhances the individual IG. Yet,
if the relationship between group fitness and fitness of the g
cells that comprise the G group is considered, then there is
likely to be decoupling. Here there is no direct effect of g cell
growth (or number) on G group fitness, but there are indirect
effects. Earlier, we reasoned that type 2 evolves only if groups
Figure 4. Fitness decoupling in type 2 multicellularity. Contour plot
for the number of G groups of a type 2 organism versus growth rates
of IG and g cells (details in supplementary material (available from
stacks.iop.org/PB/10/035001/mmedia)). Since groups are produced
via IG cells, the number of groups is only affected by the growth rate
of IG. In contrast, the growth rate of g cells has no effect on the
number of groups. If an organism with growth rates defined by pt1
evolves to pt2, then the fitness of groups increases while the fitness
of g cells decreases and the fitness of IG cells increases. The
occurrence of fitness decoupling between group and individual
levels depends on which cell type (g or IG) represents the individual,
‘lower’, level.
offer a benefit to IG cells. In the specific circumstance that
the benefit is directly proportional to the number of g cells,
or their growth rate, then fitness decoupling would not occur.
In all other cases, fitness of the higher level likely decouples
from the lower. So for type 2 organisms, if IG cells are the
individual entities then the system is MLS1, but if g cells are
considered the individual entities then the organism resides
in MLS2 territory. By extension, if both IG and g cells are
classified as the individual entities, then the system is either
MLS1 or MLS2 depending on the proportions of each type of
cell.
At first glance, type 3 organisms appear to reside within
MLS1 territory. Groups reproduce via I cells, so for a fixed rate
of transition between I and g cells, groups that produce more
I will yield more offspring. Since the conditions that maintain
type 3 multicellularity select for maximum geometric mean
fitness via transitions between I and g cells, it is possible to
conceive of G groups or g cells as merely a way to increase the
propagation of I cells. Groups would be vehicles to increase I
cells in the population and advantages common to g and I cells
would rapidly fix. In a simple model in which g and I cells
switch randomly with some probability, then the groups with
the largest number of g cells are likely to produce the largest
number of I cells, which are themselves group offspring. Thus,
type 3 organisms are seemingly MLS1 in nature.
Although type 3 multicellularity appears to be MLS1, it
may evolve according to an MLS2 framework. The key to
seeing the MLS2 context involves recognition of the fact that
group offspring are valued more than individual cells. I cells
that increase the probability of producing a g cell exchange I
offspring for group offspring. If this increased productivity of
g cells occurs in an environment that favors I cells (EI) then
the total cell number decreases but group number increases.
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Figure 5. Fitness decoupling in type 3 multicellularity. The
advantage in group offspring a type 3 organism gains from
increasing transition probability, or cell growth rate, in comparison
to a reference organism that has divided ten times and produces g
cells with probability 10−6 (details in supplementary material
(available from stacks.iop.org/PB/10/035001/mmedia)). Increasing
transition probability to ≈ 10−3 exceeds the advantage of doubling
the growth rate. Since increasing transition probability is potentially
easier than growing twice as fast, the organism is likely to evolve to
tune its transition probability. Increasing the transition probability
decouples fitness (MLS2) while changes wrought via alterations in
growth rate retain the organisms within the MLS1 state.
In this case, type 3 multicellular organisms operate within the
MLS2 framework.
To determine whether MLS1 or MLS2 is more likely, we
model the population growth of type 3 organisms that begin
in the I state and grow until the environment switches to favor
the G state—recall that for type 3 multicellularity to evolve
the environment must fluctuate between favoring G groups
(environment EG) and I cells (environment EI). If we assume
there is an optimal number of groups G that must be produced
by the time the environment switches to favor the G state (EG),
then this can be achieved by either increasing the growth rate of
I, or by increasing the probability of producing a g cell from I
(the transition probability). From this, we create an equivalence
using the common currency of the number of g cells produced
(figure 5). Whether the growth rate or transition probability
evolves to achieve a certain number of groups depends on
the likelihood of the two events. Experimental observations
show that after 20 000 generations E. coli cells propagated
in the same environment, while increasing in fitness, have
not doubled their growth rate [28]. In contrast, organisms can
increase the transition probability between states by several
orders of magnitudes in just 100 s of generations [23]. Thus,
the optimal number of group offspring is more likely to be
obtained by manipulating transition probability, as opposed to
increasing growth rate. So, while type 3 organisms may appear
to exist within an MLS1 framework, selection is more likely
to operate on the rate of transition between cell types, thus
moving the organism into the MLS2 arena. Furthermore, this
selection on transition probability is likely to lead to fitness
decoupling.
Figure 6. Emergent fitness in type 3 multicellularity. The frequency
of a type 3 organism in competition with one that grows 5% faster
(both I and g cells) but has different transition probabilities between
cells. The frequency of the slow growing type drops close to 0
before the tenth environmental cycle (where EG ↔ EI is one cycle)
and yet subsequently enters into a stable oscillation in which it
becomes the dominant organism by the 50th environmental cycle.
The fitness of the slower growing organism is not dependent on the
numbers or fitness of either I or g cells, but rather their interplay.
In type 3 organisms, fitness can be an emergent property,
not residing at either group or individual level. To illustrate
this point, we compete two type 3 multicellular organisms,
one of which grows 5% faster in both the I and g
states compared to the other (figure 5). The organisms
have different probabilities/rates of transition between the
two states. We propagate the two organisms in regularly
oscillating environments (environments switch when the
population of cells reaches a carrying capacity of 109)
in which a subpopulation (2 × 103) passages through the
fluctuations (details in supplementary material (available
from stacks.iop.org/PB/10/035001/mmedia)). For the first five
environmental oscillations the slower growing types decrease
in frequency in both states until they are almost extinct. They
then increase in frequency until they reach a stable oscillation
in which both slower and faster growing organisms co-exist.
Such behavior shows that once there is an advantage to
produce opposing types, population dynamics may diverge
from monotonic extinction or dominance and take more
complex trajectories. The fitness of the collective type 3
organism does not rest in either group or individual states,
nor in their average, but rather in the interplay between them.
4. Conclusions
Multicellularity has evolved on multiple independent
occasions, but the starting states and conditions are unknown
[1–3]. Each transition began with unicellular organisms that
gave rise to groups that subsequently evolved Darwinian
properties. Of these Darwinian properties, group level
reproduction is arguably seminal. Once groups evolved the
capacity to transmit heritable variation to group offspring—no
matter how marginally—there was opportunity for selection
to act upon nascent groups. Indeed, the particular mode of
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reproduction has implications for the partitioning of variation
(heritability) among offspring. Here, with interest in these
earliest stages, we have outlined a logical framework for
understanding the set of possible routes from unicellular
organisms to primordial, self-reproducing groups. Among
these routes are some that deliver groups that lack rudimentary
Darwinian properties, but which may nonetheless evolve these
properties by non-Darwinian means. Other routes, by virtue
of fortuitous events of chance and history, may, even at the
moment of origin, deliver groups capable of participating
directly in the process of evolution by natural selection.
Central to our framework is recognition of the need for
fluidity between individual (unicellular) and group states. This
is not only a prevalent feature of many extant multicellular
types, but was likely relevant for the initial (primordial) stages
in the evolutionary emergence of multicellularity. It is tempting
to think of the transition to multicellularity as cataclysmic: a
moment of abrupt change that delivered self-replicating groups
ready formed and replete with Darwinian properties at the
very moment at which they diverged from their unicellular
ancestors. Although we consider this possible, for example,
via the type 1 route, it is more probable that the first groups
lacked any capacity for autonomous replication beyond that
inherent in the unicellular state from which they emerged.
In this context, type 2 and 3 multicellularity have special
significance as these routes permit fluidity between individual
and group states. This fluidity, while permitting a return to the
unicellular state, allows for repeated opportunities to transition
Darwinian individuality. However, any such opportunity is
likely to be dependent on specific ecological conditions: the
longer each nascent group is maintained, the more opportunity
selection has to shape the emergence of Darwinian characters.
In considering the earliest stages in the formation
of self-replicating groups, constraints associated with the
MLS framework—particularly the notion that evolutionary
transitions begin within an MLS1 framework and then
transition to MLS2—become apparent. MLS theory was
inspired by the hierarchical organization of extant multicellular
forms, characteristic of organisms with both a high level
of cellular integration and clearly marked divides between
generations (typically a consequence of a dedicated germ
line involving a bottleneck phase) [6–10]. In these organisms
the nesting of levels (cells within organisms) is a defining
feature. Consequently it makes sense to think of one level of
organization where groups beget groups and another (lower
level) where cells beget cells. The difficulty is that the
earliest multicellular forms—and many extant forms—do not
comfortably fit this framework. For example, among the
earliest groups it is conceivable that some did not always
beget groups (but beget unicellular organisms, which then
beget groups). Initially, such reproduction would have likely
been driven by mutation or some other stochastic mechanism,
resulting in unreliable life cycles. The MLS framework does
not readily accommodate these situations where groups beget
individual cells or individual cells beget groups—particularly
when they do so in a noisy fashion. Indeed, even among extant
multicellular organisms, such as slime molds (where cells
beget groups and groups beget cells) the MLS framework sits
with some difficulty.
While establishing plausible initial stages for the
emergence of multicellularity, our framework makes no
predictions as to the likely course of evolution for each
form. It could be that some starting conditions and states
are better suited for the evolution of complex traits such as
developmental programs, division of labor, differentiation, and
life cycles, than others. Indeed, types 2 and 3 encompass forms
that arguably show primitive division of labor, a nascent soma /
germ line distinction, and developmental programs. Yet the
selective conditions required for the maintenance of these two
types are likely to be stringent in comparison with groups that
emerge via the type 1 route. Further, the fluidity permitted by
our framework means that while an organism may begin as
type 1, it may shift to a type 2 group by virtue of a g cell that
differentiates into a dedicated germ line. Additionally a type 2
group may evolve into type 3 should a g cell randomly give rise
to an I cell. In addition, it is conceivable that a type 3 group
G might evolve a means of multiplication thereby foregoing
the I state and shifting to a type 1 organism. Thus, primitive
multicellularity could transition between forms and states
numerous times before settling into a stable configuration.
Just as our framework offers no long-term predictions
for the final form of multicellularity, it makes no specific
predictions concerning the most probable starting state.
Ecological circumstances (along with chance and history) are
likely to be critical in determining whether groups emerge via
type 1, 2, or 3 routes. However, it is possible that certain
configurations are more likely than others. For example—
given appropriate ecological conditions—type 1 organisms
can emerge, in principle, via just a single event (production
of g cells with specific properties). Similarly type 2 maintains
I cells but simply requires that at some point they produce
g cells with appropriate characteristics. Type 3, on the other
hand, requires that I cells not only produce special g cells but
that these g cells in turn produce I cells. There is experimental
evidence that this is possible [23] but it is likely that the type 3
route is more demanding, both in terms of genetic architecture
and ecological conditions, than types 1 and 2.
Although we argue that type 1, 2 and 3 pathways
logically encompass the full swathe of early multicellular
forms, there are important underlying assumptions. First of
all, we assume that autonomy of individual cells is maintained.
Cells remain independent entities and cannot merge to form
new individuals. If a multicellular organism were to form as
a consequence of cell fusion, such that the group was not
composed of distinct individual cells, then the framework
outlined here would not be applicable. One reason for requiring
autonomy is that the specific way cells fuse or lose identity
is likely to have a significant impact on evolution of the
collective. This makes it difficult to logically construct a
distinct, small number of types. Additionally, cell fusion is
likely to create chimeric organisms thus impacting negatively
on the emergence of group heritability.
There are some interesting connections between the
evolution of multicellularity as outlined here and other areas
of evolutionary research. The selective conditions necessary to
maintain type 1 multicellularity are analogous to those required
for any newly evolved species [29]. In type 2 organisms, IG
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cells engage in a costly behavior by producing g cells. Thus
in order to be favored over II cells, IG cells need to reap
some selective advantage. This same challenge is present in
explanations for the evolution of public goods, cooperation,
altruism, and germ line sequestration [19, 30]. Type 3
multicellularity has similarities with bet-hedging strategies
like bacterial persistence [24–27] since both require fluctuating
selection. Thus, these well-recognized problems in evolution
are united in our framework as describing the challenge of
maintaining groups in different types of multicellularity.
Finally, our framework connects to recent thinking on
the emergence of biological individuality, and particularly
issues surrounding the assignment of individuality to non-
paradigm status multicellular organisms [5, 31]. Many extant
multicellular organisms, including slime molds and algae, exist
in multiple states, i.e., a combination of I and G. Take for
example the brown alga Ectocarpus siliculosus, which exists
as a sporophyte, gametophyte, and parthenophyte [32]. Our
framework shows that for organisms that exist in multiple
states at different stages of the life cycle, the fitness or success
of the organism does not rest in any one state nor a sum
of states. Consider two genotypes of the brown alga, one of
which produces more sporophytes, but fewer parthenophytes,
than the other. It is not clear which of the two is the more
fit. Indeed, our framework makes this clear. In this example
(and also the example shown in figure 5), individuality does
not rest in one state or in a sum of states, but rather is an
emergent property. As an emergent property, it exists in the
complex interactions between states and is not reducible to a
single state or level.
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